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THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT:
NEW STANDARDS PROVIDE NEW HOPE
E. L. Baldinucci*
If we are to keep our system secure and our society stable, we
must all begin to work where all of us work best-and that is in
the communities where we all live.
Lyndon B. Johnson, August, 1964
Introduction
In 1989, Silfrido Rias and Edwin B. Canaan, two Dominican Re-
public trained lawyers, decided to start a business in the Washing-
ton Heights section of Manhattan.' The partners came across one
major stumbling block-access to capital. 2 Lacking a credit his-
tory, they were forced to finance their project by gathering capital
from relatives, credit cards, an informal revolving loan fund fi-
nanced by other immigrants and, eventually, a loan shark that
charged six percent a week on a $10,000 loan.'
Mr. Frias' and Mr. Canaan's story is not unusual in low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods nationwide. The lack of credit
and banking services in inner city communities traditionally has
helped perpetuate urban poverty4 and impede economic improve-
ment.5 With this backdrop of continuing economic stagnation,
* The author thanks Professor Carl Felsenfeld, and journal editors Rachel Si-
mon, Lee Rudy and Bernard Daskal for their helpful comments and suggestions; and
Eleanor Baldinucci for her support.
1. Matthew Purdy & Joe Sexton, Short of Banking Services, The Poor are Impro-
vising, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1995, at Al.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Peter Dreier, America's Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C.
L. REv. 1351, 1363-64 (1993). The author notes that the government's official poverty
line is defined by a family of four surviving on an income of less than $13,924. Using
that figure, forty-three percent of America's poor were living in inner cities by 1989.
The author also notes that there are some who feel that these numbers are based on
outdated data and that they do not reflect the true extent of inner city poverty.
5. Community reinvestment was a major part of President Clinton's economic
platform in 1992. See Gov. BILL CLINTON & SEN. AL GORE, PtrrING PEOPLE FIRST:
How WE CAN ALL CHANGE AMERICA 11-12 (1992). See also Peter P. Pitegoff, Ur-
ban Revitalization and Community: Finance: An Introduction, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
613, 614-15 (1994) (discussing the acknowledgment by liberal and conservative urban
critics that economic development is of fundamental importance in rebuilding dis-
tressed cities).
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Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in
1977.6
The CRA requires federal banking regulators to consider a de-
pository institution's 7 record of meeting the credit needs of the lo-
cal communities in which it is chartered8 when that depository
institution seeks to expand or merge with another institution.9 Of
course, the CRA is not the sole prerequisite by which a bank is
allowed to merge with or acquire another institution; rather the
federal supervisory agency must "take [the bank's] record into ac-
count" when evaluating its application. 10 The CRA is controversial
legislation. Banking trade groups have fought the law since its in-
ception." They argue that it will lead to government mandated
credit allocation and that its compliance burden is too high."2 As a
result, some members of Congress propose to revoke the law, or to
curtail substantially its effectiveness.13  On the other hand, com-
6. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07 (1994). At the CRA proposal hearings, Senator
Proxmire stated that "Government through tax revenues cannot and should not pro-
vide more than a limited part of the capital required for local housing and economic
development needs. Financial institutions in our free economic system must play the
leading role." See Community Credit Needs: Hearings on S. 406 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977) [here-
inafter Hearings] (opening statement of Sen. William Proxmire).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a). The Act covers "regulated financial institution[s]," 12
U.S.C. § 2902(2), including insured national banks, state banks and savings associa-
tions. 12 U.S.C. § 1813 (a)-(1)-(4). For instance, credit unions have not been subject
to CRA regulation.
8. See infra note 23. Because of concern that the law would force bad business
decisions, Congress was careful to require that banks only take action within "the safe
and sound operation of such institutions." 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b).
9. 12 U.S.C. § 2902(3)(E). The following applications require the federal agency
responsible to review an institution's CRA record: for a national bank or federal
savings and loan charter; for deposit insurance for a newly chartered state bank, sav-
ings and loan, or similar institution; for the establishment of a domestic branch; for
relocation of a home office or branch; for mergers, consolidations, asset acquisitions,
or liability assumptions that otherwise require regulatory approval; and for the acqui-
sition of shares in, or assets of, a regulated institution that would otherwise require
regulatory approval. See § 2902(3).
10. 12 U.S.C. § 2903.
11. See statement of Sen. Morgan: "If bills of this nature are pushed to their ulti-
mate conclusion, then the day will come when a financial institution may be forced to
make an unsound loan in a specific location in order to meet its quota of loans in a
given locality." 123 CONG. REC. 17,628 (1977).
12. See Linda Corman, Study Finds Documentation Biggest Factor in CRS Rating,
AM BANKER, June 3, 1991, at 7 (discussing the ability of large banks to obtain positive
CRA ratings because of the extra resources available to document their activity); see
also infra note 43 (definining credit allocation).
13. Congressional members have introduced a number of bills meant to undercut
the CRA. See, e.g., H.R. 1699, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 1362, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 1211, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 1019, 104th Cong., 1st
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munity groups that support the premise of the law complain of
weak federal regulatory agency enforcement. 14 These criticisms
are enjoying a renewed fervor in large part because of the recent
flurry of mergers and acquisitions in the banking industry.'5
This Comment reviews the history of the CRA and proposes so-
lutions for the controversies surrounding both the merits of its un-
derlying rationale and the means by which it is implemented. It
argues that Congress should allow the recently issued federal su-
pervisory agencies' regulations 16 time to take effect before propos-
ing any changes that would restrict the CRA's effectiveness.' 7
Further, when changes are made, the emphasis should be not on
curtailing the CRA, but on extending its scope to include non-bank
financial institutions.' 8
Part I chronicles the CRA from its adoption to its present status,
including its revision under the Financial Institutions Reform Re-
covery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).19 Part II reviews
the major criticisms of the CRA's supporters and detractors. Part
III introduces the recent regulations issued by the regulatory agen-
cies responsible for enforcing the CRA and the Congressional re-
sponse to those regulations.2" Part IV concludes that the CRA can
Sess. (1995); H.R. 317, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 1858, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995); H.R. 2520, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); S. 650, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 131-135 (1995).
14. Matthew Lee, executive director of the Bronx-based Inner City Press/Commu-
nity on the Move and Fordhan Law student, referred to the Federal Reserve Board's
recent approval of Chemical Bank's acquisition of Chase Manhattan Bank as "overly
bank-friendly." Jaret Seiberg, Activists Hammer Fed for Approving Megamerger in
Advance of CRA Report, AM. BANKER, Jan. 10, 1996, at 2.
15. See Purdy & Sexton, supra note 1, at Al, B6 (discussing the Chemical Bank
and Chase Manhattan Bank merger as emblematic of a larger trend in the banking
industry).
16. See infra note 20 (listing the federal agencies responsible for enforcing the
CRA).
17. All regulated institutions will be evaluated completely under the new regula-
tions as of July 1, 1997. However, there are certain data collection and reporting
requirements that are effective January 1, 1996 and January 1, 1997. Omer S.J. Wil-
liams & Jay L. Gracin, New Standards for CRA Obligations, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1995,
at 5.
18. See infra Part IV.B (recommending that the CRA be expanded to include
mortgage lending institutions and credit unions).
19. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 1212, Stat. 183, 526-27 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 2906).
20. There are four federal agencies responsible for enforcing the CRA. The Fed-
eral Reserve Board of Governors (the Fed) oversees state chartered banks that are
members of the Federal Reserve System; the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) regulates all state chartered banks and savings banks that are not part of the
Federal Reserve System but are insured by the FDIC; The Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency is responsible for national banks; and, the Office of Thrift Supervision
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be a more effective legislative response to the lack of banking serv-
ices in poorer inner city communities if the recent agencies' regula-
tions are allowed to take effect and if careful steps are taken to
extend the CRA to non-bank financial institutions.
I. The Community Reinvestment Act
The CRA departs from the traditional view that a bank's only
responsibilities are to pursue monetary gain and preserve financial
stability." Ordinarily, bank customers have no knowledge or con-
trol over the use or application of their deposits. As one commen-
tator noted, banks are free to "support national or international
enterprises engaging in discriminatory practices, companies pollut-
ing the environment, or even dictatorial governments."22 The
CRA, however, places a continuing, affirmative obligation on
banks to meet the credit needs of their communities-including
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods-by providing appro-
priate credit needs and deposit services.23
Federal regulators have found it difficult, because of the CRA's
vague language, to maximize the potential of the law. For example,
the CRA does not define a "low-" or "moderate-income neighbor-
hood," and it gives only vague instructions regarding what steps a
bank must take to satisfy the law's mandate.24 Furthermore, con-
(OTS) regulates savings and loan companies insured by the FDIC. 12 U.S.C.
§ 2902(1)(A)-(D).
21. See Richard Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act,
20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165, 170 (1993).
22. Rochelle E. Lento, Community Development Banking Strategy For Revital-
izing Our Communities, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 773, 774 (1994).
23.
12 U.S.C. § 2901 provides that:
(a) The Congress finds that-
(1) regulated financial institutions are required by law to demonstrate
that their deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the
communities in which they are chartered to do business;(2) the convenience and needs of communities include the need for
credit services as well as deposit services; and
(3) regulated financial institutions have [a] continuing and affirmative
obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local communities
in which they are chartered.
(b) It is the purpose of this chapter to require each appropriate Federal
financial supervisory agency to use its authority when examining fi-
nancial institutions, to encourage such institutions to help meet the
credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered con-
sistent with the safe and sound operation of such institutions.
12 U.S.C. § 2901.
24. Id.
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troversy surrounding the Congressional intent behind the CRA's
adoption has made it difficult for those involved in enforcing and
studying the law to determine how best to implement it.25 No-
where has congressional intent in the enactment of the CRA been
more murky than over the role of racial considerations.26
A. Racial Discrimination, Redlinining and Community
Disinvestment
Although many commentators stress the importance of the CRA
in improving the credit and banking resources available to minori-
ties,27 Congress did not intend to remedy racial discrimination by
lenders. Of course, one can reasonably assume that Congress
knew that large numbers of minorities would benefit from the
CRA.2 8 However, Congress intended primarily to help local com-
munities by encouraging banks to invest in neighborhoods that
they historically ignored. The text of the CRA addresses geo-
graphic discrimination and did not, until 1991, even mention racial
discrimination. 29  Further, the congressional debate surrounding
the proposed CRA further evidences the legislators' understanding
25. See Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, and Community Economic Empow-
erment: Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1487 (1994) (suggesting that racial discrimination and geo-
graphic discrimination, in the context of credit availability, are clearly interrelated).
26. Id
27. Id. at 1406; see also Mollee Bennett, Resolving the Community Reinvestment
Act Dilemma: Eliminating "Whites Only" Mortgage Lending While Reducing Regula-
tory Red Tape, 24 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1993). Ms. Bennett posits that
although there is no language in the CRA that speaks to race-based discrimination,
"the scrutiny on low- and moderate-income neighborhoods has the practical effect of
highlighting discrimination because these neighborhoods tend to be minority areas."
Id.
28. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act:
An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291, 299 n.20 (1993) (discussing Congress'
understanding of racial discrimination and the CRA).
29. See supra note 6; see also Hicks v. RTC, 970 F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 1992)
(finding that the language of the CRA does not address racially discriminatory lend-
ing policies). The 1991 amendment provides that an agency evaluation should con-
sider losses or contributions when a bank donates, sells on favorable terms, or makes
available rent-free a branch in a predominantly minority neighborhood to a minority
bank or a women's bank. 12 U.S.C. § 2907. A 1992 amendment provided that an
agency's evaluation should consider a majority-owned bank's capital investments,
loan participation, and cooperative ventures with minority-owned and female-owned
financial institutions and low-income credit unions. 12 U.S.C. § 2903(b). These re-
cent amendments remain the only reference to race or gender in the CRA.
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that the law was intended to improve banking services in poorer
communities, irrespective of race.3"
Contemporaneous with the CRA, Congress passed other legisla-
tion that specifically addresses racial concerns. 31 For example, in
1976, Congress enacted amendments to the Equal Credit Opportu-
nity Act of 1974 to prohibit lending discrimination based on race,
color, religion and national origin.32
Congress adopted the CRA to remedy two very distinct, yet
closely related, problems confronting inner city communities: red-
lining and community disinvestment.33 The term "redlining"
originated with the practice by executives at banks and other lend-
ing institutions of literally drawing a red line around a certain
neighborhood and designating it as an area where no loans for
30. Sen. Morgan, in attacking the proposal, thought that the CRA would require
an institution "to make an unsound loan in a specific location in order to meet its
quota of loans in a given locality." 123 CONG. REc. 17,628. On the other hand, Sen.
Sarbanes, in defending the proposal, asked, "[w]hy should not a banking institution
have a responsibility to meet the credit needs of the local communities in which they
are located." 123 CONG. REC. 17,633; see also Macey & Miller, supra note 28, at 299
n.20 (1993) (quoting from 123 Cong. Rec. 17,628 and 17,633 (1977)). Macey and
Miller aptly sum up the role of racial discrimination in the enactment of the CRA:
"This is not to say that concerns about race, ethnicity, or gender may not have been
present in the minds of some members of Congress during the deliberations on the
legislation. Such concerns, however, appear hardly at all in the written record, and
appear at most as a subtext in the statements of certain legislators." Id.
31. Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976 (ECOA), Pub. L. No. 94-
239, 90 Stat. 251. Congress amended the ECOA to provide the following:
(a) Activities constituting discrimination
It shall be unlawful for any creditor to discriminate against any appli-
cant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction-
(1) on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital
status, or age (provided the applicant has the capacity to
contract);
(2) because all or part of the applicant's income derives from any
public assistance program; or
(3) because the applicant has in good faith exercised any right under
this chapter.
15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1994). Failure to comply may result in actual or punitive dam-
ages, as well as for costs and attorneys' fees. See 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (1994).
32. See ECOA Amendments of 1976, 90 Stat. at 251 (amending 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691(a)). Also, the ECOA functions differently than the CRA in that it allows for a
private cause of action against institutions. See Hicks, 970 F.2d at 382 (not allowing
for a private cause of action based on the CRA). As discussed, the CRA only permits
federal regulatory agencies to restrict a bank from making certain business transac-
tions unless the bank has demonstrated some level of investment commitment to its
local community. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
33. Hearings, supra note 6, at 1.
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business or property would be made.34 Today, the term is used fig-
uratively to define any institution's systematic pattern of lending
discrimination.
Geographic redlining can stem from both rational and irrational
decision making.35 Banks rationally discriminate when they "re-
strict lending or are less aggressive in marketing loan products in
certain neighborhoods because the costs of identifying the quali-
fied loans are too high to be profitable. ' 36 Irrational redlining oc-
curs when banks decide not to lend or to do business in a certain
area because of prejudices wholly unrelated to the rationally per-
ceived costs or credit risks.37 The CRA's broad language makes no
distinction between rational and irrational geographic redlining-a
major criticism of banks.38 Banking groups argue that penalizing
rational behavior and encouraging irrational behavior forces banks
to make unsound business decisions.39
Closely tied to the concept of redlining is community disinvest-
ment.4 Community disinvestment occurs when a bank takes in
34. There are a number of definitions of redlining. For example, redlining has
been defined as "the alleged bank practice of systemically denying mortgages in cer-
tain neighborhoods because of economic conditions or racial factors not strictly re-
lated to loan experience." Reinvestment: Public Deposits, COMP. NEWSL. (Council
on Mun. Performance, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 17, 1977, at 1, reprinted in Community
Credit Needs: Hearings on S. 406 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1977); see also Richard A. Givens, The "An-
tiredlining Issue: Can Banks Be Forced to Lend?, 95 BANKING L.J. 515 (1978) (defin-
ing redlining as a "restriction of credit based on geography as such, apart from any
consideration of actual creditworthiness."). The latter definition more directly speaks
to the goals of the CRA.
35. Brooke Overby, Symposium: Shaping American Communities: Segregation,
Housing & the Urban Poor: The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered, 143 U.
PA. L. REV. 1431, 1451 (1995).
36. William C. Gruben et al., Imperfect Information and the Community Reinvest-
ment Act, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. ECON. REV., Summer 1990, at 28 (discussing
the CRA's impact on lending patterns).
37. Overby, supra note 35, at 1451.
38. 12 U.S.C. § 2901; see also statement of Sen. Morgan, supra note 11.
39. 123 CONG. REC. 17,628-17,629 (1977). In fact, the Act does not force banks to
do anything. It merely "encourages" banks to invest in their local communities. 12
U.S.C. § 2901(b).
40. Some commenters see redlining as a specific type of disinvestment that is sim-
ply focused on perceived "poor credit risk" areas-lower income neighborhoods.
Bennett, supra note 27, at 1147. However, the two cannot be linked in every instance.
Overby, supra note 35, at 1451-2. For instance, a bank might invest outside of its
community because that community has no credit needs. Thus, the bank's disinvest-
ment is not redlining but simply sound business judgment. Id. This is an important
distinction because the CRA calls for banks to act "consistent with the safe and sound
operation of such facilities." 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b).
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funds from one locality and reinvests in other areas.41 The title of
the Act, the Community Reinvestment Act, evinces the enacting
legislators' concern that disinvestment is a major cause of urban
depredation, and one of the reasons for the CRA's adoption.42
B. 1978 CRA Enforcement Regulations
Because of concerns that the CRA would lead to credit alloca-
tion,43 legislators appeased banking groups and other lawmakers
by imposing weak guidelines for enforcement. 44 Congress left it to
the federal supervisory agencies to adopt specific enforcement
regulations. 45
The agencies' 1978 regulations imposed three basic requirements
on banks: community delineation, disclosure, and compliance.46
Community delineation, how a neighborhood is defined, was left to
the bank's discretion; however, a bank could not exclude low- or
moderate- income areas, and it had to include the area contiguous
to the offices of the bank itself.47 The disclosure provision required
banks to post a CRA notice for public view in their branches or
41. For a discussion of the different understandings of redlining and disinvestment,
see Stephen Trzcinski, Note, The Economics of Redlining: A Classical Liberal Analy-
sis, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1197 (1993).
42. 123 CONG. REC. 17,603 (1977). Senator Proxmire stated that "[W]e find many
banks and many savings and loan [sic] which take money from the community and
reinvest it elsewhere, in some cases abroad, in some cases in other parts of the coun-
try. That is fine, provided it is not overdone. We have found many cases where these
institutions have invested virtually nothing in the local community." Id.
43. Although the precise definition of credit allocation is a controversial issue, it
can be defined as government-mandated lending quotas. See Orin L. McCluskey, The
Community Reinvestment Act: Is it Doing the Job?, 100 BANKING L.J. 33, 38 (1983).
44. 123 CONG. REC. 17,628 (1977). Senator Garn, in arguing against the bill,
stated during deliberations that: "[W]e are heading for credit allocation and Govern-
ment bureaucrats sitting back here interfering with the private sector." Hearings on S.
406, supra note 6, at 324. Senator Proxmire, the main proponent of the CRA, stated
with equal force that: "[T]his is not a credit allocation bill and I certainly don't see it
that way. Whatever we can do to prevent it from being a credit allocation bill I want
to do." Id. at 154.
45. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07.
46. Although under the CRA different institutions are governed by different fed-
eral agencies, the enforcement regulations promulgated by the agencies are identical.
See FDIC Interp. Ltr. LEXIS 31 (May 17, 1995).
47. See Overby, supra note 35, at 1459. A bank could delineate its community by
using the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas or political boundaries or portions
thereof which surrounded the bank, its office, or branches; the local lending area
surrounding each office or group of offices in which the bank made a substantial por-
tion of its loans, and all other areas equidistant from those areas; and any other rea-
sonably delineated local area that fulfilled the purpose of the CRA. Id. at 1459,
n.126. See also 12 C.F.R. § 228.3(b) (1993).
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office lobbies,4 8 to inform customers and community residents of
their rights under the CRA.4 9 The compliance requirement sub-
jected banks to a five-tiered numerical rating system,50 but beyond
that the directives were unclear.5'
During its initial twelve years, from 1977 to 1989, the CRA re-
quired, in effect, nothing more than a good faith effort on the part
of banks to become more aware of the communities in which they
did business 2.5  As a result, between 1977 and 1988 the agencies
blocked only eight of fifty-thousand applications for mergers or ex-
pansions due to a bank's failure to meet its CRA obligations. 3
C. FIRREA and Community Based Organizations
In 1989, in response to growing criticism of the effectiveness of
the CRA,54 Congress amended the law as part of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIR-
REA).55 FIRREA clarified the CRA in two significant ways.
First, it required banks to disclose to the public its regulatory
agency's written evaluation of its practices. 56 Second, the five-
tiered numerical grading system was replaced with a system based
on only four categories: (1) "outstanding," (2) "satisfactory," (3)
"needs to improve," and (4) "substantial non-compliance. '57
48. See 12 C.F.R. § 228.6.
49. Id.
50. The system rated banks numerically from one to five. The definition of the
numerical ratings were as follows: 1 = outstanding; 2 = good; 3 = satisfactory; 4 =
needs improvement; 5 = unsatisfactory. See Glenn Canner, The Community Rein-
vestment Act: A Second Progress Report, 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 813, 816 n.1 (1981).
51. See 45 Fed. Reg. 63,133-134 (1980). For example the agencies, when assessing
compliance, made their determinations based on banks' "sensitivity and response" to
the credit needs of their local neighborhood. Id. at 63,134.
52. See Community Reinvestment Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1988) [hereinafter
1988 Hearings].
53. Bennett, supra note 27, at 1149.
54. See 1988 Hearings, supra note 52, at 7-8. Senator Proxmire, in his opening
statements, had the following to say: "Regulators seem to think that we're all living in
Lake Woebegone. Like the children of the fictional village, U.S. lenders are all above
average. Almost all get high ratings year after year and almost none is ever held back.
The committee surveyed CRA rating procedures and found that more than 97 percent
of all lenders passed with flying colors.... I wish we had graders like that when I was
in school." Id.
55. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.
L. No. 101-73, § 1212, 103 Stat. 183, 526-27 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 2906).
56. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(a).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2).
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These new provisions were to provide more specificity and a more
neutral grading system for CRA examinations.58
The regulatory agencies, in turn, put forth a joint policy state-
ment explaining the new changes and the increased emphasis on
documentation of bank compliance efforts.59 In this policy state-
ment, the agencies promulgated a list of twelve new assessment
factors to be used by the agencies when examining banks for CRA
compliance.60 The factors provided banks and community groups
with more detailed and specific guidelines for developing and as-
sessing a CRA plan.6'
58. Overby, supra note 35, at 1460-61.
59. See Statement of the Federal Financial Supervisory Agencies Regarding the
Community Reinvestment Act, 54 Fed. Reg. 13,742 (1989); 12 C.F.R. § 25.7 (1992).
60. The twelve factors were:
a) Activities conducted by the bank to ascertain the credit needs of its com-
munity, including the extent of the bank's efforts to communicate with mem-
bers of its community regarding the credit services being provided by the
bank;
(b) The extent of the bank's marketing and special credit-related programs
to make members of the community aware of the credit services offered by
the bank;
(c) The extent of participation by the bank's board of directors in formulat-
ing the bank's policies and reviewing its performance with respect to the
purposes of the Community Reinvestment Act;
(d) Any practices intended to discourage applications for types of credit set
forth in the bank's CRA statement(s);
(e) The geographic distribution of the bank's credit extensions, credit appli-
cations, and credit denials;
(f) Evidence of prohibited discriminatory or other illegal credit practices;
(g) The bank's record of opening and closing offices and providing services
at offices;
(h) The bank's participation, including investments, in local community de-
velopment and redevelopment projects or programs;
(i) The bank's origination of residential mortgage loans, housing rehabilita-
tion loans, home improvement loans, and small business or small farm loans
within its community, or the purchase of such loans originated in its
community;
() The bank's participation in governmentally insured, guaranteed, or subsi-
dized loan programs for housing, small businesses, or small farms;
(k) The bank's ability to meet various community credit needs based on its
financial condition and size, and legal impediments, local economic condi-
tions, and other factors; and
(1) Other factors that, in the Comptroller's judgment reasonably bear upon
the extent to which a national bank is helping to meet the credit needs of its
entire community.
12 C.F.R. § 25.7 (1992).
61. 54 FED. REG. 13,743-44. The assessment factors were part of a larger discus-
sion that addressed the agencies' views on all aspects of the CRA, including documen-
tation and the role of the CRA evaluation in the examination process. Id. at 13,745-
746.
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Most importantly, by 1989 community based organizations
(CBOs) started to become a powerful voice in the CRA examina-
tion process. 62 Because of lax regulatory enforcement, CBOs took
the lead in using the CRA to improve bank services in low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods.63 CBOs have done this in two
ways: one, by raising challenges to bank applications with the reg-
ulatory agencies on the grounds that banks have not satisfied their
CRA obligations; and two, by negotiating CRA lending agree-
ments with banks. 64 This development was furthered by the 1989
amendments to the CRA.65 The new disclosure requirements that
gave the public greater access to CRA ratings strengthened the
CBOs' position in challenging bank applications and in negotiating
with banks. It also allowed CBOs to subject banks and their super-
visory agencies to greater political pressure throughout the
process.66
Banks felt the impact of the amended CRA and the role of
CBOs most acutely in larger transactions. For example, the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, when considering the application by
BankAmerica to acquire Security Pacific, held public hearings in
four cities and heard testimony from approximately 175 wit-
nesses. 67 Although the merger was ultimately approved, organized
protests by CBOs secured approximately $12 billion from
BankAmerica in community based lending commitments. 68
Although FIRREA and increased compliance requirements
have greatly increased the role of CBOs in the CRA approval pro-
cess, successes, such as the BankAmerica settlement, remain the
exception. For instance, in 1990, the Federal Reserve Board de-
62. 1988 Hearings, supra note 52, a*t 216 (noting that between 1984 and 1985 appli-
cation protests increased from 3 to 19 and between 1986 and 1987 they increased from
20 to 36).
63. See generally Marsico, supra note 21.
64. Id.
65. See supra note 56-7 and accompanying text.
66. See Macey and Miller, supra note 28, at 301.
67. See Overby, supra note 35, at 1467. Professor Overby also posits that it was
the 1989 Federal Reserve Board denial, partially on CRA grounds, of an acquisition
application by Continental Bank Corporation and Continental Illinois Bancorp (not
the new FIRREA amendments) that was responsible for the increased role of CRA
compliance in the application process. Id. at 1465.
68. Id. at 1467. BankAmerica's commitments included: 1) $150 million for long
term financing of low-income housing; 2) $100 for government sponsored small busi-
ness programs; 3) $200 million per year for conventional small business loans under
$50,000; and 4) $12 million annually for a consumer loan program geared to low-
income families. Status of the Community Reinvestment Act, S. REP. No. 121, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1992).
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nied only one of twenty-seven CRA-protested applications.69
Thus, although CBOs have found some success in the CRA-protest
process it became increasingly apparent throughout the late 1980s
and early 1990s that more needed to be done to strengthen the
effectiveness of the CRA. 70 At the same time, however, banks that
are subject to CRA regulation were becoming frustrated with the
burden of complying with a law that many began to see as
misguided.7'
II. Criticisms of the CRA
Since its enactment in 1977, the CRA has been the subject of
severe criticism. The criticism, however, hails from two very differ-
ent perspectives. Some critics agree with the underlying theory be-
hind the CRA-that banks should be encouraged to invest in their
local communities-but argue that the regulatory agencies do not
sufficiently enforce the CRA.72 Other critics doubt the potential
benefit of the CRA, and argue that it should be abolished.73 The
latter group argues that even if the CRA were enforced properly, it
can never be an effective means of rebuilding poorer
communities.74
69. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS
102D CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
Acr 1-6 (Comm. Print 1992). The Fed found that First Interstate BancSystem of
Montana, Inc. had not met its CRA obligations when the bank attempted to merge
with Commerce Bancshares of Wyoming. 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 1007, 1007 (1991).
70. See Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It
Works but Strengthened Federal Enforcement is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 293,
301-2 (1993). The first twenty-four months after the public disclosure provision was in
effect, about two-thirds of all lenders were examined for CRA purposes. Of the
banks examined, 9.7% were rated outstanding; 79% as satisfactory; 9.8% rated a
needed to improve; .9% were in substantial non-compliance. This was only about an
11% failure rate (needs to improve or substantial non-compliance). Although this
was an increase from the three years preceding the new requirements (which was
about a 2.5% failure rate), the great majority of banks still passed. Id.
71. See generally, Macey and Miller, supra note 28, at 295. The authors argue that
the CRA is based on outdated ideology. They posit that the Act is premised on a
questionable model of credit markets, and that there are only normative grounds put
forth in defense of localized community lending. Id.
72. See Fishbein, supra note 70.
73. See Macey & Miller, supra note 28, at 295.
74. Id.
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A. The CRA: Ineffective Legislation?
Criticism concerning the overall viability of the CRA is, unsur-
prisingly, strongest from members of the banking community.75
Banks generally argue that they bear too heavy a burden in rela-
tion to other financial institutions that are not regulated by the
CRA,76 and reject the idea that banking should be a localized
industry.77
The relaxation of interstate banking laws and improvements in
information processing and communication have caused wide-
spread consolidation in the banking industry.78 Consolidation is
thought to be more efficient and, consequently, more beneficial for
all of society. 79 Some critics of the CRA argue that the nationaliza-
tion and internationalization of the banking industry has rendered
archaic the concept of a bank's responsibility for its immediate
community.80 The CRA impedes efficient consolidation of bank-
ing resources by allowing CBOs to intervene in the process of
mergers and acquisitions8' and by strongly encouraging banks to
invest in local communities.82
Other commentators have suggested that bank consolidations
might not be the most desirable result for the banking industry or
75. See Andrew Miller, The New York Proposal To Revise The Community Rein-
vestment Act: A Quantitative Step Towards Objectivity And Effectiveness, 43 CATH. U.
L. REV. 951, 964 n.88 (1994) (citing Barbara A. Rehm, ABA: Cost of Compliance
Equals 59% of Bank Profits, AM. BANKER, June 18, 1992, at 1, 12 (discussing banker
opinion that compliance with the CRA is the most expensive component of federal
bank regulation). The estimated cost of compliance with federal regulations, includ-
ing the CRA, was equal to 59% of the commercial banking industry's total profits, or
$10.7 billion in 1991, according to the American Bankers Association. Id. at 1. Costs
included salaries and benefits for employees hired to comply with regulations, as well
as costs associated with outside consultants, lawyers, and employee training. Id. at
12). Id. Of course, there are also some scholars who question its worth in today's
economy. See Lawrence J. White, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good Inten-
tions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281, 282 (1993) (stating
that the CRA is "fundamentally flawed").
76. See supra note 7.
77. Miller, supra note 75, at 959-60.
78. See statement of Janet L. Yellen, 81 Fed. Res. Bull. 1093-97 (1995) (discussing
the role of technology in the changing national and international banking structure).
79. Macey and Miller, supra note 28 at 322. The authors note that Harris Bancorp
of Chicago aborted its merger with First Geneva Banqueshares allegedly because it
anticipated a "needs to improve" rating from the Fed. Id. at 323.
80. See Macey and Miller, supra note 28, at 305-7 (discussing the expansion of the
banking industry).
81. See Marsico, supra note 21 and accompanying text.
82. Id.
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society.83 For instance, mergers are often driven by inefficient or
irrational motives such as managers' self-interest or vanity.' To
characterize all bank mergers and acquisitions as efficient is to ig-
nore the complex web of social and economic factors at work in the
banking industry and the economy as a whole. Moreover, large
banking institutions have a history of being unreceptive to small
business and community institutions.85 Thus, the CRA seeks to
achieve economic efficiency while accounting for other societal
goals and values, such as the promotion of small business.
CRA critics stress that the law only regulates certain financial
institutions, placing them at a disadvantage in relation to other fi-
nancial competitors in the marketplace.86 CRA-regulated financial
institutions complain that conforming with the law requires exten-
sive documentation 87 that is expensive and time-consuming to pre-
88pare. 8 One commentator described this disadvantage as "a tax on
covered financial institutions and their expansion. 89
CRA supporters respond to the disparate treatment argument
by noting that CRA regulated depository institutions are granted
special protection from the government. 90 These protections in-
clude deposit insurance and emergency funding in case of financial
panic.91 Additionally, the regulated institutions "protect a large
portion of society's assets, provide liquidity to the financial system,
83. See Taibi, supra note 25, at 1500 (critiquing neo-classical assumptions of bank-
ing and the CRA).
84. Id. at 1500-1. Professor Taibi notes that "most large bank mergers during the
1980s failed to reduce costs and actually lost value for the acquiring bank's sharehold-
ers; that mergers are often pursued for managers' self interest and that [m]assive
banking consolidation would most likely reduce, not improve, industry efficiency." Id.
85. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential
Risks of Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1040 (1992).
86. See supra note 11. This concern was in large part the impetus behind a provi-
sion in the proposed 1993 Community Reinvestment Act Reform Act that sought to
subject mortgage banks to CRA regulation. H.R. § 1700, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 101(a) (1993). The provision read: "each mortgage bank shall have an ongoing
responsibility to meet the credit needs of all communities in which such bank makes a
significant number of extensions of credit or extends a significant amount of credit,
including extensions of credit in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods of such
communities. Id. at § 201.
87. See Miller, supra note 75, at 964 n.88.
88. See Corman, supra note 12, at 7.
89. See Overby, supra note 35, at 1443.
90. See Miller, supra note 75, at 961 (discussing the "safety net" that banks receive
from the Federal Reserve System).
91. Id.
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and 'transmit' monetary policy." 92 This important role in society
justifies extra regulation such as the CRA.
In response, some commentators propose extending the CRA to
include other non-bank financial institutions.93 Many non-bank fi-
nancial institutions are not subject to CRA regulation, but none-
theless enjoy many of the "safety net" benefits of the federal
government.94 Thus, the CRA's expansion is justified because
many other institutions are receiving government benefits and be-
cause "[s]ociety has an interest in capital flows beyond ensuring
that capital receives the greatest direct rate of return. It is legiti-
mate for a democratic government to facilitate socially productive
investment. ' 95 In other words, if these institutions are usurping
large parts of traditional banks' roles in the market, then they
should also adopt banks' social obligations. For instance, the mort-
gage industry has benefited greatly from a government-created sec-
ondary market for mortgage loans.96
Another argument put forth by critics is that the CRA forces
banks to allocate credit and banking services to high risk communi-
ties where return on capital or investment is low and risk is high.97
The contention is that if CRA loans were safe and profitable, then
banks would make them regardless of whether the CRA required
it.98 However, there is much recent empirical data which suggests
that CRA loans are equally as safe as conventional loans, if not
safer.99
Further, this argument assumes that banks would act completely
rationally, with no biases involved in lending or investment deci-
sions. Also, the language of the CRA specifically calls for banks to
make loans that are commensurate with safe and sound banking
92. Id. (The author also mentions the long history of regulation in the banking
industry and the recent government bailout of the thrift industry as further justifica-
tion, especially from a taxpayer's standpoint, for regulation such as the CRA).
93. Howard L. McMillan, Jr., Dumb and Dumber (Credit Unions have Unfair
Competitive Advantage Over Banks), A.B.A. BANKING J., March 1995, at 15.
94. Id. at 961-62.
95. Taibi, supra note 25, at 1496.
96. Id.
97. See Macey and Miller, supra note 28, at 321 ("[T]he CRA encourages deposi-
tory institutions to devote depositor funds to low-profit or losing propositions in dero-
gation of overall economic welfare . .
98. Id.
99. See generally THE WOODSTOCK INSTITUTE AND THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING LENDERS, SOUND LOANS FOR COMMUNITIES: AN ANALY-
SIS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT LOANS (1993) (concluding
from a sample of CRA loans that single-family CRA loans had substantially lower
deliquency rates than conventional loans).
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practices.100 The CRA was written specifically to avoid credit allo-
cation by giving banks the ability to choose the loans and invest-
ments that they could make. 1 1
B. Enforcement Criticisms
CRA commentators and proponents both decry the lack of pur-
poseful agency enforcement.102 Proponents of the CRA complain
that the federal supervisory agencies tend to stress procedure and
documentation over actual performance when reviewing CRA
compliance efforts. 10 3 Many commentators and community groups
desire more objective and results-oriented examinations. 0 4 Be-
cause of the agencies' orientation towards process and not results,
community activists argue that the Act has not become a truly ef-
fective tool against the dearth of banking and credit services in
poorer neighborhoods. 05 In fact, if it were not for the develop-
ment of CBOs involvement, the CRA would be almost completely
ineffective. 10 6
III. A Results-Oriented Community Reinvestment Act
Relentless criticism led the federal regulatory agencies to pub-
lish initial CRA regulation revision proposals in December 1993.107
These proposals were revised in 1994, and finalized in April of
1995.108 Some members of Congress, however, have lost faith in
the CRA and have responded with a litany of attacks to abolish it,
100. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
102. See generally Fishbein, supra note 70 (discussing the lack of effective imple-
mentation by federal supervisory agencies).
103. Id.
104. See Michael Klausner, Symposium: Shaping American Communities: Segrega-
tion, Housing & the Urban Poor: Market Failure and Community Investment A Mar-
ket-Oriented Alternative to the Community Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561,
1564 (1995) (discussing the willingness of banks to accept the CRA under a more
results-based regime).
105. Fishbein, supra note 70, at 296-97.
106. Id. See also Marsico, supra note 21, at 171 (noting that federal regulators have
been hesitant to enforce aggressively the CRA and that CBO's have been the ones
using it to further development in low- and moderate-income communities).
107. See Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,466, 67,467
(1993) (proposed Dec. 21, 1993) (the federal agencies conducted one of the most ex-
tensive rule-making proceedings in their history-including a series of seven public
hearings around the nation that received over 6,700 comment letters, 50 other submit-
ted written statements, and heard from over 250 witnesses).
108. Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 25, 228, 563e, 203, 345) [hereinafter Final Regulations].
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or to curtail the effectiveness of the new regulations.0 9 Although
the onslaught from members of Congress and other critics contin-
ues, 110 the new regulations offer both the banking industry and
community groups significantly improved possibilities to achieve
their goals under the CRA. Thus, Congressional critics should
slow their attack on the CRA and allow the new regulations to
take effect before proposing further amendments.
A. Final Regulations
The new regulations abandon the 12 factor assessment criteria11" '
and replace them with a three-pronged evaluation method: (1) the
lending test; (2) the service test; and, (3) the investment test."12
Also, in response to past criticisms, the regulations provide sepa-
rate performance criteria for certain small banks and wholesale or
limited purpose institutions." 3 Banks no longer have the require-
ment of preparing and filing a detailed CRA statement for each
delineated community they serve.'14 Instead, banks need only sub-
mit the information that they normally would develop to identify
potential markets and customers. 1 5 Also, the regulations provide
an alternative strategic plan" 6 that allows banks to assess their
CRA requirements before applying to an agency. 117 These tests
and performance criteria offer banks, regulators and community
groups clearer and more objective standards when examining CRA
compliance.
109. See supra note 13 (listing a number of recently proposed Congressional bills
intended to undercut the CRA).
110. Id. See also Claudia Cummins, U.S.: Vary CRA Rules for Big, Small Banks,
AM. BANKER, Dec. 9, 1993, at 1, 3 (discussing the data collection requirements under
the new regulations).
111. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
112. FDIC Interp. Ltr. LEXIS 31, 46-50 (May 17, 1995) (discussing the new
regulations).
113. Id. at 75-78.
114. Id. at 49.
115. Id. at 81-87. "Wholesale" institutions are those that do not provide "home
mortgage, small business, small farm, or consumer loans to retail customers." "Lim-
ited purpose" institutions are those that provide "only a narrow product line, such as
credit cards, to a regional or broader market." Id. at 4-6.
116. See infra Part III, § A(1) (discussing the new strategic plan available as an
option to banks).
117. FDIC Interp. Ltr., supra note 112, at 49-50.
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1. New Tests
Lending activity remains the primary focus in a CRA evalua-
tion." 8 The "lending test" assesses a bank's CRA compliance by
evaluating the bank's record of home mortgage lending, small busi-
ness lending, small farm lending, consumer lending" 9 and commu-
nity development lending.' 20 Each bank will be rated within its
assessment area on its willingness to meet credit needs; its volume
of lending; the geographic distribution of loans among individuals
of different income levels and businesses; its lending record to the
most disadvantaged sections of the area, and to low income indi-
viduals and businesses; its use of innovative lending practices; and
its leadership position in community development lending.' 21
The agencies will base their evaluations on loan originations and
purchases rather than on outstanding loans.122 This approach is
better for all actors involved in the CRA process. It provides a
more accurate reflection of a bank's current activity by minimizing
any obscurity caused by past activity,2 3 without increasing the
bank's data collection requirements.2 4
118. See Williams & Gracin, supra note 17, at 5. Lending, particularly retail, resi-
dential real estate, small business and small farm lending, is the main focus of the new
regulations. The primary factor contributing to a CRA rating will be the volume and
distribution of a bank's loans. See Jeanine Catalano, New CRA Regulation May Pose
More Problems For Banks Than Old One, 14, No. 12 BANKING POL'Y REP., June 19,
1995 (page reference not available).
119. Consumer loans are those that are extended to one or more individuals for
household, family, or other personal expenditures. See supra note 112, at 35.
120. "Community development lending" is defined as: (1) Affordable housing (in-
cluding multifamily rental housing) for low- or moderate-income individuals; (2)
community services targeted to low- or moderate-income individuals; (3) activities
that promote economic development by financing businesses or farms that meet the
size eligibility standards of 13 CFR § 121.802(a)(2) or have gross annual revenues of
$1 million or less; or (4) activities that'revitalize or stabilize low- or moderate-income
geographies. See supra note 112, at 24-25.
121. See Overby, supra note 35, at 1470-71. For an "Outstanding" (0) under the
lending test, the institution must generally have "excellent responsiveness" in this cat-
egory; for a "high satisfactory" (HS), "good responsiveness;" for a "low satisfactory"
(LS), "adequate responsiveness;" for a "needs to improve" (NI), "poor responsive-
ness;" and for a "substantial noncompliance" (SN), "very poor responsiveness." The
same grading system is applied to the other tests. Id. at 1471 n.187(citing forthcoming
codification in 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A(b)(1)(i)(A), (ii)(A), (iii)(A), (iv)(A), (v)(A)).
122. See FDIC, supra note 112, at 53-54. A loan "originates" at the time it is issued.
Thus, the new regulations evaluate how many loans were issued at any given time, not
how many loans are actually outstanding.
123. Although, a bank nonetheless can opt to provide data on loans outstanding,
"which may, in certain circumstances, enhance an examiner's understanding of an
institution's performance." Id. at 54-56.
124. Id. at 54.
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The "investment test," in keeping with the essence of the new
regulations, emphasizes the actual investments made by a bank.125
The supervisory agency's examination will consider the number of
"qualified investments,"' 26 the innovativeness and complexity of
the qualified investments and the bank's responsiveness to the
credit and economic development of the community. 127 This is sig-
nificant because it allows banks alternative ways to fulfill their
CRA obligations. 12
Under the "service test," the agency evaluates a bank's geo-
graphic distribution of branches within its service area, its number
of branch openings and closings, its alternative systems 29 of bank-
ing services available to low- and moderate-income individuals and
areas, and the type of services offered.130The bank's branches and
other delivery systems, do not have to be accessible to every part of
its assessment area but there cannot be "conspicuous gaps in acces-
sibility, particularly to low- or moderate-income areas or individu-
als.' 131 The examining agency will also consider the extent of the
bank's innovativeness and responsiveness to community develop-
125. See FDIC, supra note 112.
126. "Qualified investments" include, but are not limited to, investments, grants,
deposits or shares in or to financial intermediaries that primarily lend to low- or mod-
erate-income areas or individuals, for the purpose of community development. Id. at
41.
127. Id. at 69.
128. The concept of allowing a bank to fulfill its CRA obligations simply by invest-
ing, with nothing else, is criticized by some community groups. Swidler, infra note
157, at 412-13. However, the new regulations do not allow banks to "invest away"
their CRA obligations. Instead, consideration of investments is only one piece of a
larger whole. Community development corporations (CDCs) are one example of an
innovative investment plan a bank might undertake. CDCs are organizations, com-
prised of local financial institutions, created specifically to address community lending
and financial needs. Overby, supra note 35, at 1525-26. By pooling their resources in
a CDC, banks can reduce the costs associated with identifying potential borrowers
and processing information related to those borrowers. Id.
129. Automatic teller machines are an example of an alternative delivery system,
although the regulations give more weight to branches that offer a broader range of
services. See FDIC, supra note 112, at 72.
130. Overby, supra note 35, at 1472. The test focuses on an institution's current
distribution of branches and "does not require an institution to expand its branch
network or operate unprofitable branches." See FDIC, supra note 96, at 73.
131. See FDIC, supra note 112, at 74.
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ment services, 13 and its leadership position in providing those
services. 133
2. Alternative Evaluation Methods
The "community development test" is available to wholesale and
limited purpose institutions that, because they do not offer tradi-
tional banking services, have difficulty meeting the criteria of the
other tests.' 34 Under this test, the bank will be evaluated by its
record of making qualified investments, by its involvement in com-
munity development lending, and by its record of offering commu-
nity development services. 35 The community development test
evinces an understanding on the part of the federal agencies that
not all banks operate the same. By granting consideration to activ-
ities that are targeted to broader statewide or regional areas, and
by granting CRA credit to wholesale or limited purpose institu-
tions for servicing areas beyond their delineated assessment
area, 136 the agencies have given banks more flexibilty in meeting
their CRA obligations.
In the same vein, the test for small retail institutions 137 acknowl-
edges the fact that small banks operate differently from large
banks. Under the "small institutions performance standards," the
focus is on the bank's loan-to-deposit ratio in relation to reported
loans to low- and moderate-income individuals, loans to small busi-
nesses and farms, loans in low- and moderate-income geographies
and other lending related activities, while focusing on the bank's
responsiveness to public complaints concerning the bank's efforts
to meet its community credit needs.138 A small bank only needs to
132. See supra note 108. "Community development services" are defined as serv-
ices that focus primarily on community development, that are related to the provision
of financial services, and that are not otherwise considered under the service test. Id.
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(0)).
133. See supra note 108 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A(b)(3)(i)(D),(ii)(D), (iii)(D), (iv)(D), (v)(D)).
134. See supra note 115 (defining "wholesale" and "limited purpose" institutions).
135. See supra note 108. See also supra note 109 for a definition of qualified invest-
ments; supra note 103 for a definition of community development lending; supra
note 114 for a definition of community development services.
136. See Williams and Gracin, supra note 118, at 7 (discussing the diminishment of
the significance of a bank's restriction to its assessment area/community delineation
for CRA credit).
137. "Small retail institutions" are defined as independent institutions with assets
of less than $250 million or affiliates of a holding company with total banking and
thrift assets of less than $1 billion. See Final Regulations, supra note 108 (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(t)).
138. Id. (to be codified in various sections of 12 C.F.R. § 228).
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achieve an overall satisfactory rating in order to be granted an out-
standing rating under the small institutions performance stan-
dards. 139 And, most importantly, small banks are exempted from
the loan reporting requirements of larger banks, lessening their
compliance burden. 140  This evaluation method is significant be-
cause it is estimated that up to 85% of CRA regulated institutions
are in this group.' 41
The "strategic plan" option is the most significant part of the
Final Regulations. 42 As an alternative to being rated under the
lending, service, and investment tests, a bank can submit. to its su-
pervisory agency a detailed plan, developed with community input,
that describes how it proposes to meet its CRA obligations. 43 The
plan must set forth sufficiently detailed and measurable goals for
meeting its community credit needs to allow the public and the su-
pervisory agency to judge its merits.'" The bank's performance
will then be assessed by how well it meets the goals of its plan.145 If
a bank cannot meet the goals of its strategic plan, it nonetheless
has the ability of being evaluated under normal applicable assess-
ment criteria. 46
139. Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A(d)(2)).
140. Id. (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 228.42(a)).
141. See Overby, supra note 35, at 1477 n.220
142. See Final Regulations, supra note 108 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
§§ 228.21(a)(4), 228.27)
143. Id. See also supra note 115, at 82.
144. See Final Regulations, supra note 108 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 228.27(d)).
The bank must, for a minimum of 30 days before submitting the plan to its supervi-
sory agency, seek public comment on its plan. At least three months before the effec-
tive date of the plan, the bank must submit the proposed plan to its supervisory
agency along with: (i) a description of its formal and informal efforts to seek sugges-
tions from the public; (ii) any written public comments received; and (iii) if revisions
were made in response to public comment, the initial strategic plan as was first re-
leased to the public. Each institution is judged in the context of its own characteris-
tics, including its particular community, business operations and level of CRA
activity, in light of similarly situated institutions. Further, the agency will consider (i)
the extent of lending related activities, (i) the amount, innovativeness, complexity,
and responsiveness of qualified investments, (iii) the effectiveness and availability of
the bank's services, and (iv) the extent and innovativeness of the bank's community
development services. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.27(g)(2)-(3)). See also
Williams and Gracin, supra note 118, at 7; Overby, supra note 35, at 1478 n.234.
145. Id. If the supervisory agency does not approve or disapprove of the submitted
plan within sixty days, the plan is automatically approved. Williams and Gracin, supra
note 118, at 7.
146. Id. The plan must require a bank to achieve a minimum rating of satisfactory.
FDIC, supra note 108, at 85. An outstanding rating is available only if the plan con-
tains goals for outstanding ratings. Final Regulations, supra note 108 (to be codified
at 12 C.F.R. § 228.27(0(3)).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIII
IV. Evaluation and Recommendations
A. Evaluation
Further CRA amendment, without seeing the effects of the re-
cently adopted federal supervisory agencies' regulations, would be
premature at this point. The Final Regulations answer effectively
many of the criticisms and questions raised by the banking industry
and community groups. Given the research and extensive
rulemaking proceedings undertaken by the federal supervisory
agencies,147 it would be imprudent for Congress to enact legislation
that abolishes or undercuts the CRA without giving the new regu-
lations a chance to be implemented fully and to take effect.' 48
The Final Regulations provide financial institutions with more
objective criteria to assess their CRA performance. 49 For exam-
ple, the strategic plan option provides an institution with complete
certainty of its CRA position. 150  Although the plan requires a
bank to solicit frequently unwanted community input, at least the
bank will be better able to assess its position beforehand. Given
the increasing strength of CBOs, 151 the plan allows banks to calcu-
147. See supra note 107.
148. See Letter from John Hawke, Under Secretary, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, to
The Honorable James A. Leach, Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Commit-
tee on Banking and Financial Services (Nov. 3, 1995) ("[B]y focusing on hard data
about lending, services, and investments, the rules will narrow the issues over which
institutions, regulators, and community groups can disagree, and reduce the likeli-
hood that a protest will raise new information that delays application-processing.").
149. Because the CRA does not mandate credit allocation, there must be room for
some agency discretion. However, the new regulations balance this need with the
need for more objectivity in the examination process. See Final Regulations, supra
note 108 (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. § 228.21(b)). The examining agency evaluates a
bank under the tests within the context of information about the bank, its community,
its competitors, and its peers. The agency will consider the following:
(1) The economic and demographic characteristics of the institution's as-
sessment area, including median income levels, housing information;
(2) Information concerning the institution's lending, investment and ser-
vice opportunities in its assessment area;
(3) The institution's product offerings and business strategy;
(4) The institution's financial and economic capacity and constraints;
(5) The prior performance of the institution and the performance of simi-
larly situated situations;
(6) The institution's public file;
(7) Any other relevant information.
Id.
150. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
151. See Dominic Bencivenga, Challenging Bank Deals: New Tactic Wins Review of
Regulatory Approval, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 19, 1995, at 5 (col. 2). The author describes
community groups such as Inner City Press/Community on the Move as no longer just
an annoyance to banks seeking to merge or consolidate, but as a "major headache."
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late their transaction costs more efficiently. Furthermore, banks
can only gain positive publicity by announcing their plans to invest
in local communities. 152
Community groups also will benefit from the Final Regulations.
By encouraging public input, the agencies have acknowledged the
importance of local community groups in the CRA process.'53
Banks, instead of seeing CBOs as their opponents in a merger or
acquisition, 54 will be more apt to cull information from CBOs to
lessen their compliance costs. Because community groups make it
a practice to be more informed about the credit needs of their spe-
cific community,155 banks have added incentive to work closely
with CBOs in order to reduce their research CoStS.' 56
Furthermore, CBOs can play an important role after CRA loans
are extended. Too often, prospective borrowers have very little ex-
perience in the loan process and either have trouble obtaining the
loan or, once it is obtained, have trouble budgeting their financial
resources and debts. 57 Thus, a bank working closely with commu-
nity groups decreases its initial costs in finding CRA borrowers,
and decreases the possibility of incurring costs later due to loan
deliquency. Any proposed legislation to curtail the development of
these relationships between banks and communities would gut the
effectiveness of the CRA.158
The group is just one of many that has challenged agency determinations in federal
court. Id.
152. See, e.g. CRA: Wells Fargo Pledges $45 Billion in Loans in Move to Sweeten
First Interstate Bid, BNA BANKING DAILY, Dec. 15, 1995, at d2 (discussing Wells
Fargo CRA pledge that includes $25 billion for small business; $8.5 billion for com-
mercial economic development; $7 billion for affordable housing and community de-
velopment efforts; $2 billion in loans for low-income consumers; and $500 million in
other community development investments).
153. See supra note 142.
154. See supra note 144.
155. CBOs are just that-community organizations. They are in touch, not only
with individual consumers, but with churches, labor unions, professional associations,
charities, and other organizations with banking needs. Fishbein, supra note 65, at 304.
156. See Claudia Cummins, Texas Commerce Puts Teamwork Into CRA, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 9, 1993, at 18 (stating that bankers "need to access the expertise that
already exists in community lending, redevelopment, and affordable housing, and find
partners that know how to get the dollars into the community.").
157. See Gary M. Swidler, Note, Making the Community Reinvestment Act Work, 69
N.Y.U. L. REV. 387, 416 (1994) (noting that community groups such as the Associa-
tion of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) employ training pro-
grams designed to explain the workings of mortgage loans while stressing to potential
borrowers the importance of making each scheduled payment on time).
158. See supra note 109. For example, H.R. 2520, in seeking to lessen banks' data
collection requirements, would do away with the public notice requirement in the
CRA. Hawke, supra note 148. The bill "insulat[es] institutions from meaningful re-
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B. Recommendations
Because the CRA is an effective means to improve communities
through economic development, 59 Congress should extend the law
to institutions not currently regulated by it. For example, mortgage
companies, though not traditional banking entitites, have become a
force in the residential real estate market and a consumer credit
source. 160 The fact that mortgage companies lend regionally or na-
tionally and therefore have no traditional "community," is an issue
that can be resolved under the Final Regulations. For mortgage
companies, the appropriate examining federal supervisory agency
could emphasize the lending test16 ' and investment test 62 and
either recommend or request a plan geared toward a targeted area
or areas.
163
This rationale is in keeping with Congress' broader view of the
concept of "convenience and needs" as it applies to the CRA.164
Although the concept is found throughout federal and state bank-
ing and regulations, 65 it has taken on a different meaning with the
CRA. Ordinarily, the phrase addresses traditional considerations
of competition and sound business sufficient to ensure a bank's
success. 166 The CRA, however, expands the phrase to require
banks to meet specific community credit needs.167 Thus, "conven-
ience and needs" is not a static phrase. As the understanding of
view under the CRA. Persons concerned about an institution's performance would
have no notice of the proposed transaction, and thus no timely opportunity to voice
their concerns and offer supporting evidence." Id.
159. See Griffith L. Garwood & Dolores S. Smith, The Community Reinvestment
Act: Evolution and Current Issues, 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 251 (1993) (noting the CRA's
influence on improving community development).
160. Overby, supra note 35, at 1524. Obviously, those in the mortgage industry
have not reacted positively to the idea of possible CRA regulation. Rik Forgo, Res-
pite May End for Mortgage Bankers, THE THRIFT REGULATOR, Oct. 25, 1993, (no
page citation). Mike Farrell of the Mortgage Bankers Association of America ques-
tions whether the underlying nature of the CRA should make it applicable to mort-
gage banks. Id.
161. Supra note 112, at 24-25 and accompanying text.
162. Supra note 112, at 28-29 and accompanying text.
163. Unless an institution chose to be evaluated under one of the alternative meth-
ods. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
164. 12 U.S.C. § 2901.
165. See the Change in Bank Control Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1817(j)(7)(B); the Bank
Merger Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B); and section three of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act, 12 U.S.C § 1842(c)(2).
166. Joseph J. Norton, "Fair Lending" Requirements: The Intervention of a Govern-
mental Social Agenda Into Bank Supervision and Regulation, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q.
REP. 17, 24 (1995).
167. Id.
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community takes on a different and broader meaning, so should
the understanding of community "convenience and needs."
Similarly, credit unions should be subjected to CRA regulations.
Once very specialized institutions for union members and other
workers that shared some "common bond," credit unions increas-
ingly are operating more and more like traditional banks. 68 Much
the way banks do, credit unions offer auto loans, credit cards, mort-
gages, personal loans and even mutual funds. 169 Thus, given the
enormity of the credit union industry, 170 subjecting it to CRA ex-
amination would have the two-fold effect of (i) leveling the playing
field vis-a-vis other financial institutions and, (ii) increasing the fi-
nancial resources available to communities.
Congress and the federal regulatory agencies should not gut a
law that is essential to rebuilding communities simply because its
administration is becoming increasingly difficult with the growing
complexity of the banking and finance industry. Instead, Congress
should seek to establish a fairer, more comprehensive and unified
regulatory structure that incorporates banks and major bank-like
financial institutions, such as mortgage companies and credit
unions.17
At the same time, investment in community development corpo-
rations (CDCs) 172 should be encouraged by legislators and the
agencies. 73 CDCs are organizations of local financial institutions,
created specifically to address community lending and financial
needs. 174 First, banks will benefit from the information-gathering
and compliance-cost reduction that comes with working with other
institutions. 175 Second, because the financial needs of neighbor-
168. See McMillan, supra note 93, at 15.
169. Id.
170. Mr. McMillan notes that credit unions reported a net income of $3.7 billion in
1993 and that they are presently a $300 billion a year industry. Id.
171. Taibi, supra note 25, at 1505 (discussing the spread of multifunctional financial
conglomerates and the emergence of an unregulated parallel banking system). Prof.
Taibi also notes that there are many commentators, including financial reformer Tom
Schlesinger and Chicago Mercantile Exchange Commission Chairman Jack Sandner,
that promote regulating all sectors of the financial industry. Id.
172. See supra note 128 for a definition of CDCs.
173. Because CDC-type investments are incorporated primarily under the invest-
ment test, and the lending test is given the most weight in the ratings process, CDC
investments are greatly under-recognized. See supra note 112 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the test criteria.
174. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
175. Overby, supra note 35, at 1526, n.397 (quoting William C. Gruben et al.:
"Since these same individual institutions perform many other types of loan functions
in-house, it is clear.. .that the establishment of such consortia serves the purposes of
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hoods vary considerably, it is difficult for even the best-intentioned
bank to determine a particular neighborhood's specific financial
needs.176 CDCs provide an opportunity to maximize the capital
available from banks with the information available from those im-
mersed in the community. Third, regulated investment in CDCs
will impede the growth of illegal credit organizations, such as loan-
sharks-an increasing source of credit for those without banking
services.177
Conclusion
The Community Reinvestment Act is effective legislation. Its
lack of efficacy thus far has been not been because it is inherently
flawed. Rather, the CRA's troubles have stemmed from its appli-
cation. By omitting financial institutions that should be governed
by the CRA, Congress has not applied the law fairly. At the same
time, Congress and the federal supervisory agencies have not ap-
plied the CRA rationally to those financial institutions that have
been governed. Thus, the CRA should not be curtailed, but
strengthened by extending it to include currently unregulated fi-
nancial institutions and by encouraging more innovative invest-
ment, such as CDCs. However, any steps taken should be in
tandem with a careful study of the effects of the federal supervisory
agencies' recently issued Final Regulations.
lowering per-institution costs of information and of spreading risk in a lending process
where such costs and risks are relatively high.").
176. Purdy & Sexton, supra note 1, at B6.
177. Id.
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